In this paper, we propose and construct a direct measure of investors' divergence of opinion based on auction bids data of the private placements in China. We nd that the rms with higher bids dispersion generate lower long-run stock returns after the issuance of private placements. This eect is economically signicant and robust when controlling for market discount, earnings management, analysts forecast dispersion, and self-selection bias. Moreover, this negative relation is stronger for stocks with more stringent short-sale constraints. Our ndings therefore provide strong evidence in support of the Miller (1977) sn this pperD we propose nd onstrut diret mesure of investors9 divergene of opinion sed on ution ids dt of the privte plements in ghinF e nd tht the rms with higher ids dispersion generte lower longErun stok returns fter the issune of privte plementsF his eet is eonomilly signint nd roust when ontrolling for mrket disountD ernings mngementD nlysts forest dispersionD nd selfEseletion isF woreE overD this negtive reltion is stronger for stoks with more stringent shortEsle onstrintsF yur ndings therefore provide strong evidene in support of the willer @IWUUA9s divergene of opinion hypothesisF JEL classication: hRRD qIPD qIRF KeywordsX rivte plementY hivergene of opinionY vongErun stok returnsY hortEsle onstrintY eution
Introduction
willer @IWUUA hypothesizes tht divergene of opinion n led to sset overEvlution nd susequent mrket underEperformneD when pessimisti investors do not tke dequte short positionsD for institutionl or ehviorl resonsF 1 sn ontrstD the risk theory of illims @IWUUA introdues heterogeneous eliefs into the gpitl esset riing wodel @gewA nd predits positive reltion etween divergene of opinion nd expeted returnsF 2 sing dierent mesures of divergeneD prior empiril work hs not yet generted onvining evidene for or ginst willer9s @IWUUA hypothesis in dierent settingsF sn this studyD we shed new light on this dete y proposing novel mesure of divergene of opinion sed on ution dtF ith this new mesureD we doument strong evidene in support of willer9s @IWUUA hypothesisF yne of the min resons for this miguity is tht we only hve indiret mesures for divergene of opinion @qrnkelD PHHWAD whih might overlp with other risk ftors nd ontin sustntil mesurement errorsF he most ommonly used mesure is dispersion of nlyst forestsF gonsistent with willer9s @IWUUA hypothesisD hiether et lF @PHHPA nd stoks with highly dispersed nlyst forests hve lower future returns thn stoks with less dispersed nlyst forestsF roweverD there re drwks of using nlyst forest dispersion to mesure investors9 divergene of opinionF pirstD it is sed on forests towrds erningsD rther thn vlutionsF eondD investors9 deisions my not follow nlyst forestsY thusD nlyst dispersion my not fully reet mrket prtiipnts9 divergene of opinionF hirdD it is ontminted y the eet of unertinty in individul forests @frron et lFD IWWVY heng nd hevenotD PHIPAF sn line with these onernsD houks et lF @PHHTA doument positive reltion etween divergene of opinion nd future returns fter removing the eet of unertinty in nlyst forestsF tohnson @PHHRA shows tht the ndings in hiether et lF 1 As summarized by Hong and Stein (2007) , there are three mechanisms driving divergence of opinion: gradual information ow, limited attention, and heterogeneous priors.
2 Varian (1985) reaches the same conclusion that heterogeneous beliefs is a risk factor in the Arrow-Debreu framework. More recently, Veronesi (2000) shows that higher information quality increases expected returns, supporting Miller's (1977) hypothesis; while consistent with Williams (1977) , Epstein and Schneider (2008) prove that there is an information ambiguity premium for stocks with low information quality.
@PHHPA n e explined y the eet of nnil levergeF he other widely used mesuresD suh s idiosynrti voltilityD turnoverD unexplined trding volumesD idEsk spredsD re lso indiret proxiesD whih re endogenous to stok priesD nd potentilly ontminted y other risk ftorsF he empiril evidene tht relies on these mesures is lso mixed nd inonlusiveF 3 hese drwks mke it diult to onlude whether evidene rejeting @or supportingA willer9s @IWUUA hypothesis is due to the theory itselfD or the proxy usedF sn this studyD we revisit willer9s @IWUUA hypothesis nd propose direct mesure of investor opinion regrding rm vlueF yur mesure is onstruted using ution dt of privte plements in ghinF here re two priing shemes for privte plements in the ghinese mrketX xed prie set y the ord of diretorsD nd n ution prie from uniform seled idsF he former is used when the issune trgets re internl investorsY tht isD ontrolling shreholders nd lok holdersF he ltter is used when the issune trgets re minly externl investorsY tht isD institutionl investors inluding mutul fundsD trustsD privte fundsD nd sset mngement ompniesD nd individul investorsF 4 ell the ution ids informtion will e pulily relesed on the privte plement ompletion nnounementsF es suggested y gmmk @IWWIA nd viu et lF @PHHIAD the divergene of the ution ids would directly reet investors9 heterogeneous eliefs on vlutionsF 5 hereforeD this mesure lrgely overomes the prolems with the existing mesuresF yur mesure is in line with the mesure proposed y qrnkel @PHHWAD who uses proprietry dt on investors9 limit nd mrket orders in individul stoks to directly mesure their privte vlutionsF roweverD in ontrst to qrnkel9s @PHHWA mesureD our ution sed mesure is pulily ville for muh longer time periodF 6 3 For example, Ang et al. (2006) and Guo and Qiu (2014) nd a negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and returns. However, Bali and Cakici (2008) nd no robust relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns,based on dierent tests. Fu (2009) even documents a positive relation between these two variables when the expected idiosyncratic volatility is used. Goetzmann and Massa (2005) and Garnkel and Sokobin (2006) reach dierent conclusions when trading volume is used as the measure of divergence of opinion.
4 See Section 4.2 of this paper for more details on the institutional background of private placements in China. 5 The generalized auction model of Milgrom and Weber (1982a,b) proves that bidders have incentives to gather extra information to increase their prots in a sealed auction. For a comprehensive review of auction theory and its applications in corporate nance, we refer readers to Dasgupta and Hansen (2008) . 6 Garnkel (2009) uses data in a narrower sample period from January 2002 to March 2002. In Garnkel yne empiril setting tht potentilly suits the sme testing pproh is snitil uli yering @syA utionsF st is possile to onstrut dispersion mesure sed on the ids dt of sy utionsF roweverD lthough the sy ution hs historilly een pplied in more thn PS mrketsD it is urrently only ville in the FFD where the usge is rreD s well s in ietnm nd possily ssrelD where there re restritions preventing the use of ook uilding @tgnnthn et lFD PHISAF wore importntlyD ids dt of sy utions is not pulily villeF sn ontrstD ids dt for privte plements in ghin is relesed with the ompletion nnounementsF fesides ution dtD ids dt in the ook uilding proesses of sy nd sesonl oering @inluding privte plementsA ould lso potentilly reet investors9 privte informtionF nfortuntelyD the ook uilding dt is lso proprietry nd unville to puliF yverllD to the est of our knowledgeD the ution dt on privte plement in ghin is the only pulily ville soure tht n e used to directly mesure investors9 divergene of opinions on rm vlutions with lrge smple sizeF o empirilly onstrut this mesureD we mnully ollet IHDRPS id reords from RII privte plement utionsD from PHHU to PHISF por eh utionD we onstrut the disperE sion of ids y two mesuresF yne is the quntityEweighted solute distneF he other is the quntityEweighted stndrd devitionF e then test willer9s @IWUUA hypothesis y investigting the reltion etween the divergene of ids nd the longEterm performne of the stokF yur smple ts willer9s @IWUUA theoretil ssumptions sine most ghinese rms fe stringent shortEsle onstrints @ghng et lFD PHIRAF e summrize the empiril ndings of the urrent study s followsF pirstD onsistent with the hypothesis in willer @IWUUAD we nd signintly negtive reltion etween the divergene of ids nd susequent oneEyer stok returns for ll the four return mesures @rw returnsD mthed smple returnsD mrket model djustedD nd gew djustedAF his negtive reltion is roust when ontrolling for the disount rte of issuing prie to the mrket prieD the sle of the privte plement issuneD rm sizeD mrketEtoEook rtioD sh holdingD yeD rm geD ook levergeD ernings mngementD yer xed eetD nd industry (2009) , the author also has not studied the relation between his divergence of opinion measure and future stock returns.
xed eetF fesides sttistil signineD we nd tht the eet of ids dispersion on longEterm return is lso eonomilly signintX one stndrd devition inrese in the ids dispersion | quntityEweighted solute distne @quntityEweighted stndrd devitionA dereses the oneEyerEhed rw returnD mthed smple returnD mrket model djusted returnD nd gew djusted return djusted return y UFTS7 @UFVS7AD SFTT7 @SFUP7AD SFIV7 @SFPI7A nd RFHV7 @RFIH7A respetivelyF eondD we test whether our mesures of ids dispersion overlp tht of nlyst forest dispersionF e nd tht ontrolling for nlyst forest dispersion does not et the sigE nine of the ids dispersionD oth qulittively nd quntittivelyF reneD our mesure of ids dispersion ontins new informtion regrding future longErun stok returnsF hirdD willer9s @IWUUA predition depends on the presene of shortEsle onstrints @foehme et lFD PHHTAF es resultD we expet tht the negtive reltion etween ids divergene nd longEterm return would e stronger for rms with more stringent shortEsle onstrintsD ceteris paribusF his further helps us evlute whether the reltion is relevnt to willer9s @IWUUA predition or merely spurious orreltion resulting from the use of proxy vrilesF e onstrut mesure of rmElevel shortEsle onstrints for our smple rmsD sed on the institutionl fetures of ghinese stok mrketF gonsistent with willer9s @IWUUA hypotheE sisD we nd tht the negtive reltion is more prevlent for rms with higher mgnitude of shortEsle onstrintsF pinllyD there is potentil seletion is in exmining smple of rms tht hoose to renne using privte plements nd trgeting on externl investorsF o ddress this issueD we dopt the smple seletion orretion proedure in rekmn @IWUWAF e rst t proit model to dierentite rms rened with privte plements nd rndom smple of rms tht hve not rennedF e then use the inverse wills rtio from the proit regression s n dditionl ontrol vrileF e lso distinguish the rms onduted privte plements with the ution prie sheme nd ones with the xed prie shemeD nd ontrol for the orresponding inverse wills rtioF he estimtion results show tht the negtive reltion etween ids dispersion nd longErun return is still roust under these two settingsD suggesting tht seletion is is not the driving foreF yur study ontriutes to two strnds of litertureF pirstD this pper omplements nd extends the tests on willer9s @IWUUA hypothesisD oth methodologilly nd sustntivelyF e onstrut novel nd diret mesure of divergene of opinion sed on ution ids dtD in the unique institutionl setting of privte plements in ghinF his mesure overomes the shortEomings of existing proxies in the litertureF e doument onsistent nd strong evidene in support of willer9s @IWUUA hypothesisF eondD our pper ontriutes to the literture on longErun underperformne of privte plementsF hierent ftors nd theories hve een proposed to explin this phenomenonD inluding the overvlution hypothesis @rertzel et lFD PHHPAD geny prolems @frly et lFD PHHUAD nd the overoptimism hypothesis wriukityte et lF @PHHSAF yur pper sheds new light on the overvlution hypothesis of @rertzel et lFD PHHPA y identing the role of diverE gene of opinion in driving overvlution nd susequent longErun underperformneF he rest of the pper proeeds s followsF e provide the institutionl kground in etion PF sn etion QD we desrie the vrile onstrution methods nd outline our dtF sn etion RD we present the empiril resultsF gonluding remrks re given in etion SF 2 Institutional Background rivte plements is reltively newD ut populrD renning methodF st hs een widely used in mny mrkets sine the IWWHsD inluding the FFD the FuFD ingporeD nd xew elnd @ruk nd uD PHHWY ermitgeD PHIHY ghen et lFD PHHPY enderson et lFD PHHTAF 7 sn terms of ghinD until IWWVD rights issues were the only renning mode villeF sn IWWVD puli oering of sesoned equity @iyA ws introduedF trting from wy PHHHD iy eme n option for most listed rms when the ghin eurities egultion gommittee @ggA issued the enttive egultion on visted pirms sssuing hres to the uli4 @fo et lFD PHIIAF sn PHHSD the splitEshre struture reform mde privte plements the 7 One reason driving the emerging popularity of private placements since 1990s is the change of regulatory environment. For instance, in April 1990 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved Rule 144A, which permits immediate sale and re-sale of private placements to \qualied institutional buyers". This rule signicantly improved the liquidity of private placements as investors were previously required to either register the securities from private placements with SEC or hold them for at least 1 year. predominnt equity issue modeD nd mny ontrolling shreholders used privte plement s wy to ompenste nonEtrdle shreholders when onverting their shres to trdle @rung et lFD PHITAF he use of privte plement hs surged sine wy PHHTD when the gg pulished egultory wesures of eurities sssune for visted gompnies4D nd it hs now eome the dominting tool for renning in ghinF por instneD s shown in le ID from PHIR to PHISD the perentges of proeeds from privte plements in totl renning pity were oth over WU7F sn PHISD there were VSU ses of privte plementsD no se of iyD nd only ve ses of rights issuesF sn omprisonD ghen et lF @PHIHA report tht from IWWT to PHHTD there re IRV trditionl privte plementsD IUVH sis nd IUQR iys in the FF mrketF yne reson for the populrity of privte plements in ghin is thtD unlike other renning modesD the gg does not impose requirements regrding prot sustinility on rms pplying to use privte plementsF 8 snsert le I here pigure I shows the timeline for privte plement in ghinD from nnounement y the ord of diretorsD nd pprovl y the shreholder meetingD nd regultory pprovl y the ggD to the trnstion itselfD nd the nnounement of its ompletionF he lengthy regultory proess mens tht privte plement will tke more thn one yer on verge from initil nnounement to nl exeution @ongD PHIRY ponsek et lFD PHIRAF snsert pigure I here here re three distintive institutionl fetures of privte plements in ghinF pirstD the gg requires tht the oeringGidding prie e no less thn WH7 of the verge stok prie for the PH dys prior to the enhmrk dteF sn prtieD rms tend to set the enhmrk dte s the dy the nnounement is mde y ords of diretorsD lthough shreholder meeting dte or the dte of the susription invittion letter ould lso e dopted @ponsek et lFD PHIRAF eondD there re two dierent priing shemesX xed prie nd utionF he prie of the equities is determined y the ord of diretors when the issune trgets of the privte plements re strtegi investorsD ontrolling shreholders nd lok holders @op IH shreholdersAD or investors seeking to eome ontrolling shreholders through privte plementsF he prie of the equities is set y uniform seled id ution when the issune trgets re minly externl investorsF sn the lter shemeD ontrolling shreholders nd lok holders n still e involved in privte plementD ut they nnot prtiipte in the ution nd n only purhse the predetermined mount of shres with the ution prieF hirdD the loking period is QT months for ll internl investors @in oth xed prie sheme nd ution shemeAD nd IP months for externl investorsF sn this pperD we fous on smples using the ution priing shemeF pigure I shows tht rms nnoune the trnstion detils in the lst phse of the privte plementF sn the se of using the seled ution priing shemeD the detils on the ids re lso reportedF le P shows the exmple of the privte plement del idding ook of the ing gomE pny @HHPSQTFAF he tle is opied nd trnslted from the ompletion nnounement nnouned y the ompny on tune ID PHISF he tle shows tht eh id reords the identity of the idderD nd the prie nd quntity of the idF e n see tht prtiipnts inlude mutul fundsD trustsD sset mngement ompniesD nd individul investorsF he idding pries vry widelyD rnging from PQFHH to QUFSVF ith this omprehensive reords of idsD we n mesure to wht wht extent the idding pries re divergentD whih reets investors9 heterogeneous eliefs regrding rm vlue @gmmkD IWWIY viu et lFD PHHIAF snsert le P here 3 Data and Variable Denitions 3.1 Data sources and sample attributes e mnully olleted ll the ids dt from nnounements mde y listed ompnies tht suessfully issued privte plements from tnury PD PHHU to heemer QID PHISF ell the nnounements re downloded from the sxh dtseF here re TUP privte plement U dels using the seled id ution during this time periodF 9 e exlude 4 @speil tretmentA or 4 @prtiulr trnsferA rms whih re prtiulrly monitored due to their poor performnesF 10 e lso exlude rms with long trding hlts within two yers from the ompletion dte of privte plementF e re nlly left with RII ution ses with IHDRPS ids in totlF e otin dt on nnil informtionD stok returnsD nd nlyst forests from the ghin tok wrket nd eounting eserh htse @gweA reted y the quotin snformtion ehnology gompny @qeAF 3.2 Variables construction e use the dispersion of the ution idding pries to mesure investors9 divergene of opinionF o onstrut the idding prie dispersionD we rst follow viu et lF @PHHIA nd use the quntityEweighted stndrd devition of the idding priesD sled y the weighted verge prieF e denote this vrile s SDF e lso onstrut nother dispersion mesure W ADD whih is the quntity weighted solute distne of the idding priesD sled y the weighted verge prieF he dependent vrile for our empiril study is the postEprivte plement longErun stok performneF yur min nlysis fouses on one yer performne to e onsistent with the loking periodD while two yers performne is lso onsidered for roustness hekF o mesure the longErun performneD we use four kinds of returns with dierent enhmrksF he rst return is rawD whih is mesured y the holding period return of the stok from one dy fter the privte plement ompletion nnounement dte to one yer lterF es roustness hekD we exlude the rst month following the privte plement nnounement dte to rule out the shortEterm nnounement eetF he seond return is matchedD whih is onstruted y the dierene etween raw nd the holding period return of mthed 9 There are 1810 private placements wtih the xed price scheme from 2007 to 2015. 10 In the Chinese stock markets, a rm that has negative prots for two consecutive years will be designated as \ST" rm. If an \ST rm continues to generate losses for one more year, it will be designated as \PT" rm and will be delisted if it cannot have a positive prot within another year. The shares of ST rms are traded with a 5% price change limit every day, compared to the 10% limit for normal rms. The semi-annual nancial reports of \ST rms must be audited. The shares of PT rms can only be traded on Fridays, with a maximum 5% upside limit to last Fridays closing price, but there is no limit on the downside (Jia et al., 2013) . rm for the sme periodF pirms re mthed on sizeD ookEtoEmrket rtioD nd industryD following frer nd vyon @IWWUAF he third return is marketD whih is the rw return minus the mrket index return of the sme periodF he fourth return is capmD whih is the from the gew modelF e lso inlude severl vriles onerning the hrteristis of the privte plement dels nd the fundmentls of the issuing rms in our empiril studyF he ution del hrteristis re percentage nd discountF percentage is the numer of issuing shres in the privte plement over the rm9s totl shres outstndingF st reets the reltive size of the privte plement delD or the dilution level of the delF es in ghen et lF @PHISAD discount is the disount rte of the issuing prie ompred to the mrket prie of the rm one dy efore the issune nnounementF he fundmentls of the rm inlude rm size log@valueAD oin9s QD sh holding cashD firmageD nd ook leverge levF log@valueA is the log of mrket vlue of the rmF Q is the mrketEtoEook rtio of the rmF 11 cash is the sh nd sh equivlent over the totl ssetF firmage is the ge of the rmF lev is the totl det over the totl ssetF e use the vlues of these ontrol vriles in the nnil yer overing the privte plement ompletion dtes in the empiril testsF fesides these vrilesD our study lso inludes two importnt ontrol vrilesF he rst one is dispersionD whih is the stndrd devition of nlyst ernings forests in the previous yerD sled y the ook vlue per shreF st is the most ommonly used proxy for divergene of opinion @hiether et lFD PHHPY tohnsonD PHHRY houks et lFD PHHTY dk nd herinD PHHUAF he seond one is emD whih is proxy for ernings mngementF ghi nd qupt @PHHWA propose tht overvlutionEindued inomeEinresing ernings mngement leds to lower future stok returnD nd ghen et lF @PHIHA onrm this reltion in the ontext of privte plementsF e onstrut em following the djusted tones wodel y hehow et lF @IWWSAX @PA where T A is the totl rulsY ¡REV is the hnge of revenuesY P P E is the gross property plnt nd equipmentY Asset is the totl ssetY ¡REC is the hnge of net reeivlesF e rst employ eqution @IA to estimte 1 D 2 D nd 3 F hen we onstrut the ernings mngement mesure em y eqution @PAF sn dditionD short:c is dummy vrile whih is equl to H if the rm is in the mrgin trding list or in the gsQHH index listD nd I otherwiseF st is proxy for shortEsle onstrintF 3.3 Summary Statistics le Q presents summry sttistisF nel e reports the hrteristis of the idsF he totl numer of ids is IHDRPSF he men @medinA idding prie is IUFIIP @IRFPHHAF he men @medinA quntity of eh id is QIDIQH thousnd @UDHHH thousndsAF he men @meE dinA dollr vlue of eh id is VDWRI thousnd @PDSST thousndsAF nel f reports the desriptive sttistis t the rm levelF he totl numer of dels in RIIF he men @medinA vlue of the dispersion of idding prie W AD is HFHVI @HFHRRAF he men @medinA vlue of the other dispersion mesure of idding prie SD is HFHWV @HFHSQAF yn vergeD the winning ids perentge per ution is TRFU7F e note tht the US7 quntile of this vrile is ID inditing tht t lest PS7 of the privte plement utions were with only single idder or multiple idders with the ext sme idF o llevite the efet of these oservtionsD we exlude the privte plement ses with less thn S idders s roustness hekF he men @medinA disount rte of the issuing prie is ITFTUV7 @ITFURH7AF he men @medinA quntity of issuing shres is ISRDWVH thousnds @SQDTRH thousndsAF he men @medinA perentge of issuing shres over the totl shres outstnding is IFR7@IFP7AF ynly PPFP7 of the rms in our smple re in the mrgin trding list or in the gsQHH index listD onrmE ing the rgument in ghng et lF @PHIRA tht ghinese stok mrket hs stringent shortEsle onstrintsF snsert le Q here IH sn le RD we report desriptive sttistis nd t sttistis of one yer longErun perforE mne vrilesF raw hs men @medinA of ESFS7 @EVFT7AF matched hs men @medinA of ETFP7 @EVFQ7AF market hs men @medinA of EQFV7 @ESFP7AF capm hs men @medinA of EIHFR7 @EIHFQ7AF yverllD the men nd medin of the four vriles re ll signintly negtiveF his is onsistent with the phenomen of longErun underperformne of privte plements in FF @rertzel et lFD PHHPA nd ghin @rung et lFD PHITAF 12 snsert le R here 4 Empirical results sn this setionD we rst nlyze the eet of idding prie dispersion on the stok longErun performneF e lso ontrol for the most ommonly used proxy for divergene of opinion | the dispersion of nlyst ernings forestsF purthermoreD we exmine the eet of shortE sle onstrint on the reltion etween idding prie dispersion nd longErun returnsF e then ddress the potentil seletion is y performing the rekmn @IWUWA smple seletion orretion proedureF pinllyD we ondut severl roustness heksF 4.1 Baseline regressions e perform regressions of the longErun performne on idding prie dispersionF he depenE dent vriles re four return mesures desried in etion QFP F he independent vriles re the dispersion of idding pries W AD or SDD the perentge of shres issuing over totl shres outstnding percentageD the rm size log@valueAD oin9s mesure QD the disount rte of the issuing prie to the mrket prie discountD the sh holding rtio cashD the return to sset rtio ROAD the ge of the rm firmageD the ook leverge levF e lso inlude yerExed eet nd industryExed eet to ontrol for overll mroeonomi ftors over time nd industry hrteristisF sndustry is dened sed on the PP industries lssied y the ggF 12 As reported in Table 3 , the mean value of discount rate is 16.67%. Henceforth, the negative long-run performance does not indicate that the participants in the auctions would suer a loss on average. e report the results in le SF he oeients of W AD nd SD re ll signintly negtiveF peillyD the oeients of W AD @SDA re EHFTIP @EHFSIHAD EHFRSQ @EHFQUPAD EHFRIR @EHFQQVAD nd EHFQPU @EHFPTTA for the four return vrilesD respetivelyF he results re onsistent with the predition of willer @IWUUAD tht the higher the divergene of opinionD the worse the longErun performneF he oeients of oin9s Q re ll positive nd signint t the I7 levelD inditing tht privte plement dels re more vlule for rms with higher investment opportunitiesF discount is mesured s the disount rte of the issuing prie to the mrket prieF here is signintly negtive reltion etween discount nd ll four return mesuresF his result is in line with the empiril ndings in fjj et lF @PHHIADurishnmurthy et lF @PHHSAD nd frly et lF @PHHUAD nd is onsistent with the rgument provided y rertzel et lF @PHHPA tht privte plement disount reets overvlutionF sn ontrst to ghen et lF @PHIHA who doument signint negtive reltion etween ernings mngement nd longErun privte plement return in the FF mrketD we fil to nd ny signint reltion in our ontextF his dierene ould e due to ft tht in ghin privte plement tkes on verge more thn one yer to ompleteF he vlution eet of ernings mngement would diminish in suh long term periodF woreoverD the prtiipnts in the privete plements re sophistited investors who would e le to detet the ernings mngement in resonlely long time periodF sn terms of eonomi signineD n inrese of one stndrd devition of our key vrile W AD @SDA will derese the longErun return raw y UFTS7 @UFVS7AD matched y SFTT7 @SFUP7AD market y SFIV7 @SFPI7A nd capm y RFHV7 @RFIH7A respetivelyF he mgnitudes of the eonomi signine re reltively lrgeD ompred to the men vlues of the longErun returns @EVFT7D EVFQ7D ESFP7D EIHFQ7AF yverllD we nd signintly negtive reltion etween the idding prie dispersion nd the longErun stok performneF yur ndings support willer @IWUUA9s preditionF snsert le S here IP 4.2 Control for analyst forecast dispersion he most ommonly used proxy for divergene of opinion in the extnt literture is the dispersion of nlyst ernings forestsF por exmpleD hiether et lF @PHHPA nd negtive reltion etween the dispersion of nlyst ernings forests nd future stok returnsD while houks et lF @PHHTA drw the opposite onlusionF o test if our key mesure provides dditionl informtion eyond the dispersion of nlyst forestsD we dd it s n dditionl ontrol vrile in the seline regressionsF he forest dispersion is onstruted y the stndrd devition of nlyst9s erning forests in the previous yerD sled y the ook vlue per shre of the rmF he nlyst dispersion mesure is positively orrelted with our ids dispersion mesures with moderte orreltion mgnitudes @HFHWR with W AD nd HFIIQ with SDAF le T reports the regression resultsF he oeients of W AD nd SD remin sigE nintly negtiveF he mgnitudes of the oeients re lose to those in the seline regressionsF he oeients of the nlyst ernings forests re ll negtiveD ut not sttisE tilly signintF reneforthD the results suggest tht the informtion of our key mesures for divergene of opinion is not overed y the dispersion of nlyst ernings forestsF snsert le T here 4.3 Short-sale constraint willer @IWUUA hypothesizes tht stok prie sujet to high dierenes of opinion nd shortE sle onstrints re ised upwrdF yur previous empiril tests show tht dispersion of opinion drives the stok prie to e overvluedF roweverD shortEsle onstrints is nother ritil ondition for willer @IWUUA9s hypothesis @foehme et lFD PHHTAF 13 e predit tht if the shortEsle onstrint of stok is more indingD the prie will e more overvluedD given the sme level of dierenes in opinionF o test this preditionD we perform regressions y interting the dispersion mesure W AD @SDA with the shortEsle onstrint mesure short:cF sn ghinese stok mrketsD stok n e shorted in two wys @qu et lFD PHITAF he rst is to orrow stoks from rokersF roweverD only those stoks ppering in mrgin trding nd shortEselling list seleted y the gg re ville to orrowF 14 hereforeD we expet tht stoks in the list inur fewer shortEsle onstrintsF e otin the list from the gg wesiteF he seond wy to short the stok is to short the gsQHH @ghin eurities sndex QHHA index futuresD if the stok is one of the QHH underlying stoksD nd long the remining stoks in the gs QHH index listF 15 e therefore expet tht stoks in the gs QHH list lso fe less stringent shortEsle onstrintF e soure the gs QHH index ompositions informtion from the ghin eurities sndex gorportion @http://www.csindex.com.cnAF fsed on these institutionl feturesD our shortEsle onstrint proxy @short:cA is dened s dummy vrile whih is equl to zero if the stok is in the mrgin trding nd short selling list or in the gs QHH listD nd one otherwiseF le U reports the regression resultsF e n see tht the oeients of the intertion term re ll negtive for the four returns nd re sttistilly signint for marketD matched nd capmF he oeients of the dispersion mesures W AD nd SD remin negtive for ll four returns mesuresF gonsidering the results in omintionD we n onlude tht short:c strengthens the negtive reltion etween divergene of opinion nd longErun stok returnsF his is onsistent with our predition tht if stok fes stronger shortEsle onstrintD its prie will e more overvlued given the sme level of divegene of opinionF snsert le U here 4.4 Sample selection bias wo kinds of potentil seletion is n rise when exmining smple of rms issuing privte plements y the ution methodF he rst is tht rms selfEselet to issue privte plement or notF he seond is tht rms whih issue privte plements selfEselet the issuing methodD tht isD ution or xed prieF rekmn @IWUWA proposes solution 14 The short-selling and margin trading scheme was launched in March 2010 (Chang et al., 2014; Gu et al., 2016) . 15 The China Financial Futures Exchange introduced index futures against the CSI 300 index on April 16, 2010 (Han and Pan, 2016). to mitigte smple seletion is y using his smple seletion orretionF his involves rstEstep proit regression to dierentite etween seleted rms nd unseleted rmsF pollowing fo et lF @PHIIAD rung et lF @PHITAD nd rung et lF @PHITAD we use oin9s mesure@QAD rm size @log@valueAAD rm ge @firmageAD sh holding rtio @cashAD ook leverge @levAD protility s mesured y the rtio of ernings efore interest over totl sset @profitabilityAD investment s mesured y the pitl expenditure over totl sset @investmentAD industry dummies nd yer dummies s the determinnts of the rm9s privte plement deisionF reneD we run the following proit regressionX h@pirmaIDHAaf@log@valueADQD firmageD cashD profitabilityD investmentD levD industry dummiesD yer dummiesA o ddress the seletion isD we ondut the rst stge of rekmn twoEstge regressions with dierent smple settingsF sn the rst settingD our seleted rms re those issuing privte plement y oth xed prie nd ution methodsD nd our unseleted rms re those not renned in the sme periodF st is notle tht during our smple periodD privte plements is the dominting renning mode in ghinF es resultD we hve not investigted rms9 hoie etween privte plements nd iy s in gronqvist nd xilsson @PHHSA nd ghen et lF @PHIHA mong othersF sn the seond settingD our seleted rms re those issuing privte plements y the ution methodD ut our unseleted rms re the rms issuing privte plements y the xed prie methodF he rst stge estimtion results re presented in le VF nel e shows the result for the rst settingF gonsistent with rung et lF @PHITAD we nd tht rms with higher oin9s re more likely to issue privte plementsD suggesting tht ghinese rms time the mrket nd use privte plements to issue overpried shresF e lso nd tht rms with lrger sizeD higher protility nd investment re more likely to ondut privte plementsD either euse they hve more renning needs or euse gg re more likely to pprove the pplitions of suh rms @fo et lFD PHIIY rung et lFD PHITAF sn nel fD we explore rms9 deision to dopt the ution method in ontrst to the xed prie methodF st is noteworthy tht the oeient of oin9s turns to e negtiveF his onrms gin the mrket timing hypothesis of rung et lF @PHITA s ompred to the xed prie methodD it IS is more diult for rms to ontrol the oering prie in the ution methodF snsert le V here tep two of the rekmn @IWUWA smple seletion orretion uses the inverse wills rtio from the proit regression s n independent vrile in the seline regressionsF he seond stge regression results for these two settings re presented in le W nd le IHF prom the tlesD we n see tht the oeients of W AD nd SD re signintly negtiveD with similr mgnitudes s shown in the seline regressionsF golletivelyD our results suggest tht the negtive reltion etween ids dispersion nd future longErun return is not driven y the smple seletion isF snsert le W here snsert le IH here 4.5 Robustness Checks sn our previous resultsD we dene the longErun performne s the returns from one dy fter the nnounement dte to one yer lterF o show tht our results re roust to dierent time horizonsD we relulte ll four returns in two wysF he rst is to relulte ll four returns from one month fter the ompletion nnouneE ment dte to one yer lter to rule out the shortEterm nnounement eetF e report the regression results in le IIF he oeients of W AD nd SD remin signintly negtiveF he mgnitudes re lose to those in the seline regressionsF snsert le II here he seond wy is to use two yers longErun performne from one dy fter the nE nounement dte to two yers lterF e report the regression results in le IPF he oeients of W AD nd SD remin negtive nd sttistilly signintF he mgnitudes re lso lose to those in the seline regressionsF snsert le IP here IT fesides using other denitions for longErun performnesD we ondut n dditionl roE ustness hek y exluding the utions with less thn ve iddersF e ondut this roustness hek to ddress the onern tht the smll numer of idders would et the eetiveness of our dispersion mesuresF roweverD s we nd in le IQD this experiment hs not ltered our estimtion results oth qulittively nd quntittivelyF snsert le IQ here 5 Conclusion ixisting studies provide mixed evidene on the reltion etween investors9 heterogeneous eliefs nd future stok returnsF he urrent study dvnes the literture y proposing novel mesure of divergene of opinionD sed on ution dt for privte plementsF yur mesures re the rst to directly reet investors9 privte informtion regrding rm vlue sed on pulily ville dtF sn this wyD we overome the onerns out the existing indirect mesures in the litertureF fsed on this mesureD we doument tht the longEterm performne of stok returns is negtively relted to the divergene of opinionF his reltion is eonomilly meningfulD nd roust when ontrolling for other rm hrteristisD ernE ings mngementD nlyst forest dispersionD nd selfEseletion isF purtherD we nd tht the eet of divergene of opinion is more prevlent for rms with more stringent shortEsle onstrintsF yverllD our evidene supports willer @IWUUA overvlution hypothesis rther thn illims @IWUUA risk theoryF yur ndingsD together with the fts tht the ution ids dt is pulily ville nd our mesures re esy to onstrutD lso oer prtitioners in the seondry privte plements mrket n ppeling mens to predit the returnsF References endersonD rmish hD vwrene g oseD nd teven p ghn @PHHTAD hierentil shreE holder welth nd volume eets surrounding privte equity plements in xew elndD4 er xoF of rivte lement roeeds xoF of iy roeeds xoF of ights sssues roeeds erentge of rivte lement @roeedsA PHHU  IRW  PURFRT  PW  TTFRQ  U  PQFHW  USFRI7  PHHV  IHS  IUHFPR  PU  RSFVW  V  IQFTS  URFHW7  PHHW  IIU  PSTFTR  IQ  PQFIW  W  IHFHV  VVFSP7  PHIH  ITH  QIQFTQ  IH  QUFUP  PI  IRFWV  TPFSU7  PHII  IUI  QRTFRV  IH  PVFVV  IP  QRFUP  VRFRW7  PHIP  IST  QTIFIP  T  IIFSS  U  TFVU  WSFIS7  PHIQ  PVI  QRRFHP  S  UFHP  IQ  RSFUH  VTFUI7  PHIR  RVT  TVIFVS  I  HFQU  IR  IQFUR  WUFWU7  PHIS  VSU  IQUPFPI  H  H  S  ISFSH  WVFVQ7 Table 6 Bids dispersion and long-run performance (control analyst dispersion)
This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance on bids dispersion of private placements controlling for analyst dispersion.The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.W AD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. S D is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table 7 Counting for short-sale constraints   This table reports the results of regressions of one year performance on bids dispersion of private placements counting for short-sale constraints. The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.W AD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. S D is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. short:c is a dummy variable which is equal to 0 if the rm is in the margin trading list or in the CSI300 index list, and 1 otherwise. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. prof itability is the earning before interest over total asset. investment is the capital expenditure over total asset. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent variable: percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. I M R1 is the inverse millers ratio from stage one probit regression in the rst setting (Panel A of Table 8 ). We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. I M R2 is the inverse millers ratio from stage one probit regression in the second setting (Panel B of Table 8 ). We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The two year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.W AD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. S D is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. This table reports the results of regressions of one years long-run performance on bids dispersion of private placements. Auctions with bidders less than 5 are excluded.The one year performance is proxied by four variables. raw is the one year holding period return of the stock. matched is raw minus the matched rm's return of the same period.market is raw minus the market index return of the same period. capm is the abnormal return adjusted by CAPM model.W AD is the quantity weighted absolute distance, scaled by the weighted average of bidding price. S D is the quantity weighted standard deviation of all bidding price for one private placement deal, scaled by the weighted average of the bidding price. percentage is the number of the issuing shares in the private placement over the total shares outstanding of the rm. log(value) is log of market value of the rm. Q is the market to book ratio of the rm. cash is the cash and cash equivalent over total assets. ROA is return on assets. f irmage is the age of the rm. lev is the total debt over total assets. discount is the discount rate of the issuing price compared to the market price. em is a proxy for earning management, which is calculated from adjusted Jones Model. dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst earning forecasts, scaled by the book value per share. We report the t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
